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PurposeThis study aimed to investigate how honest participants perceived an attacker to be during shoulder surfing scenarios that varied in terms of which Principle of Persuasion in Social Engineering (PPSE) was used, whether perceived honesty changed as scenarios progressed, and whether any changes were greater in some scenarios than others. Design/methodology/approachParticipants read one of six shoulder surfing scenarios. Five depicted an attacker using one of the PPSEs. The other depicted an attacker using as few PPSEs as possible, which served as a control condition. Participants then rated perceived attacker honesty. FindingsThe results revealed honesty ratings in each condition were equal during the beginning of the conversation, participants in each condition perceived the attacker to be honest during the beginning of the conversation, perceived attacker honesty declined when the attacker requested the target perform an action that would afford shoulder surfing, perceived attacker honesty declined more when the Distraction and Social Proof PPSEs were used, participants perceived the attacker to be dishonest when making such requests using the Distraction and Social Proof PPSEs and perceived attacker honesty did not change when the attacker used the target’s computer. Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, this experiment is the first to investigate how persuasion tactics affect perceptions of attackers during shoulder surfing attacks. These results have important implications for shoulder surfing prevention training programs and penetration tests. 

Phishing attack countermeasures have previously relied on technical solutions or user training. As phishing attacks continue to impact users resulting in adverse consequences, mitigation efforts may be strengthened through an understanding of how user characteristics predict phishing susceptibility. Several studies have identified factors of interest that may contribute to susceptibility. Others have begun to build predictive models to better understand the relationships among factors in addition to their prediction power, although these studies have only used a handful of predictors. As a step toward creating a holistic model to predict phishing susceptibility, it was first necessary to catalog all known predictors that have been identified in the literature. We identified 32 predictors related to personality traits, demographics, educational background, cybersecurity experience and beliefs, platform experience, email behaviors, and work commitment style. 

Phishing emails have certain characteristics, including wording related to urgency and unrealistic promises (i.e., “too good to be true”), that attempt to lure victims. To test whether these characteristics affected users’ suspiciousness of emails, users participated in a phishing judgment task in which we manipulated 1) email type (legitimate, phishing), 2) consequence amount (small, medium, large), 3) consequence type (gain, loss), and 4) urgency (present, absent). We predicted users would be most suspicious of phishing emails that were urgent and offered large gains. Results supporting the hypotheses indicate that users were more suspicious of phishing emails with a gain consequence type or large consequence amount. However, urgency was not a significant predictor of suspiciousness for phishing emails, but was for legitimate emails. These results have important cybersecurity-related implications for penetration testing and user training. 

Purpose This study aims to examine how social engineers use persuasion principles during vishing attacks. Design/methodology/approach In total, 86 examples of real-world vishing attacks were found in articles and videos. Each example was coded to determine which persuasion principles were present in that attack and how they were implemented, i.e. what specific elements of the attack contributed to the presence of each persuasion principle. Findings Authority (A), social proof (S) and distraction (D) were the most widely used persuasion principles in vishing attacks, followed by liking, similarity and deception (L). These four persuasion principles occurred in a majority of vishing attacks, while commitment, reciprocation and consistency (C) did not. Further, certain sets of persuasion principles (i.e. authority, distraction, liking, similarity, and deception and social proof; , authority, commitment, reciprocation, and consistency, distraction, liking, similarity and deception, and social proof; and authority, distraction and social proof) were used more than others. It was noteworthy that despite their similarities, those sets of persuasion principles were implemented in different ways, and certain specific ways of implementing certain persuasion principles (e.g. vishers claiming to have authority over the victim) were quite rare. Originality/value To the best of authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to investigate how social engineers use persuasion principles during vishing attacks. As such, it provides important insight into how social engineers implement vishing attacks and lays a critical foundation for future research investigating the psychological aspects of vishing attacks. The present results have important implications for vishing countermeasures and education.